

ANNEX C: RECOMMENDED EXCLUDED VEHICLE ACCESS, RISK ASSESSMENT

Category of veicular user	5 Blue Badge Holders
Need	Blue Badge holders are an important part of our community and are members of protected groups under the Equality Act. Previous Executive decisions balancing the rights of these groups with wider public safety matters have established two access loops that are open during footstreet hours for Blue Badge holders, to mitigate the impact on the vehicular access restrictions on disabled people.
Historic frequency of occurrence	Outside of Christmas Market period, access is open daily throughout footstreets hours between 10.30 and 17.00. During the 2024 and earlier Christmas Market, access was reduced to the Goodramgate loop only between 5pm and 7pm. An average of 1 Blue Badge holder accessed per day, though clearly there are limited city centres shops and services open during the hours of 5pm-7pm
Historic operational protocol	Blue Badge Holders approach marshalls stationed at the entrance points and present Blue Badge identification for verification to be permitted access. Exit is enabled remotely through CCTV and remote operation
Alternative approaches and mitigations considered (and reasons where unfeasible/ discounted)	ID01 Do not permit Blue Badge access as has been allowed in previous years given the ATTRO recommendation of the Chief Constable, subsequent dialogue with North Yorkshire Police, and risk assessment findings. MITIGATION Provide CYC grant support to shop mobility to enable free device hire, and promote increased membership Removal of loading to bays on Duncomb Place to create more exclusively dedicated Blue Badge parking spaces. Advanced messaging to Blue Badge holders with signporting to online support and resources
	ID02 Permit Blue Badge access between 5pm and 7pm to Goodramgate loop, as has been allowed in previous years DISCOUNT In the context of NYP recommendation to exclude vehicular access, and limited opportunities to mitigate risk of terrorist attack through the associated provisions, this option is not recommended.

		Likelihood				
		rare	Unlikely	Possible	Likely	Almost Certain
		1	2	3	4	5
Consequence	Catastrophic - fatal injury/ permanent disability	5	Moderate 5	High 10	Extreme 15	Extreme 20
	Major - serious, possibly life changing injury or illness, long term recovery or permanent disability	4	Moderate 4	High 8	High 12	Extreme 16
	Moderate - significant injury or harm requiring medical treatment	3	Low 3	Moderate 6	High 9	High 12
	Minor - minor injury requiring first aid	2	Low 2	Moderate 4	Moderate 6	High 8
	Negligible - minor injury	1	Low 1	Low 2	Low 3	Moderate 4
						Moderate 5

5 BLUE BADGE HOLDERS

Risk ID	Risk Title (event)	Implications (Consequences)	Impact	Likelihood	Gross Score	Gross Rating	Mitigation Controls	Impact	Likelihood	Net Score - Post Mitigation
1	HV/ IED attacker impersonates or is a Blue Badge Holder and gains access to protected area	HV IED attack in controlled area, extremely severe loss of life and/ or harm	5	3	15	extreme	Checking of blue badge holder identification and eligibility. Visual inspection of vehicle	5	3	15
2	HV attacker seizes vehicle with force following its entry to protected area	HV attack in controlled area, severe loss of life and/ or harm	5	3	15	extreme	CCTV observation of vehicle movement where possible and police liaison as necessary Presence of roaming security staff within Protected Area	5	3	15
3	Medical emergency or loss of control of vehicle from legitimate Blue Badge Holder causes collision	Collision with pedestrians, severe loss of life and/ or harm	5	2	10	high	Drivers required to proceed with caution (low speed) in the controlled area	5	1	5
4	Barriers fail to rise on entry of legitimate vehicle, allowing subsequent illegitimate vehicle manned by HV/IED attacker to enter protected area	HV IED attack in controlled area, extremely severe loss of life and/ or harm	5	3	15	extreme	CCTV observation of vehicle movement and police liaison as necessary Prearranged rapid deployment of barrier supplier servicing arrangements Increased frequency of subterranean mechanism cleanout Test closing of barriers each day prior to ATTRO hours commencement. Rapid deployment of Pitagone barriers in event of failure. Protocol of vehicles passing HVM pausing to block access until barriers re-close	5	2	10
5	Tailgating of legitimate vehicle on entry, allowing subsequent illegitimate vehicle manned by HV/IED attacker to enter protected area	HV IED attack in controlled area, extremely severe loss of life and/ or harm	5	3	15	extreme	CYC security staff on site and in CCTV control to maintain particular vigilance and close dialogue at times of entry, and barriers not operated to allow entry if suspicious vehicles in immediate vicinity Protocol of vehicles passing HVM pausing to block access until barriers re-close	5	2	10